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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION-WHEN DEATH PENALTY IMPOSITION BASED ON
WRONGFUL ADMISSION OF BELIEFS IN CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEED-
ING VIOLATES FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.
Ct. 1093 (1992).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Dawson v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court considered
the question of whether introduction of the defendant's membership in
the Aryan Brotherhood during a capital sentencing hearing was prohib-
ited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments when the evidence was
irrelevant to the issue being decided in the hearing.' At Dawson's pen-
alty hearing following his conviction for murder and various other
crimes, evidence relating to his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
was admitted as aggravating evidence.2 The Supreme Court held that
the admission of associational evidence during the sentencing phase of
a capital case violated the defendant's First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.'
This note examines the development of capital punishment juris-
prudence under the Eighth Amendment and briefly details the evolu-
tion of a capital defendant's rights protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Further, this note explores the Supreme Court's
current perspective on the relevance of constitutionally protected beliefs
and associations as aggravating evidence in capital cases.
I. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1095 (1992).
2.. Id. at 1096.
3. Id. at 1095.
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II. FACTS
David Dawson escaped from the Delaware Correctional Center lo-
cated near Smyrna, Delaware in the early morning of December 1,
1986 and fled south in a stolen car." Later that morning, Dawson bur-
glarized a home in the Kenton area of Delaware, taking a motorcycle
jacket, pocket watches, and containers of pocket change., About a half
mile away, Dawson entered another home and found the occupant,
Madeline Kisner, alone as she readied herself for work." Dawson bru-
tally murdered Mrs. Kisner, stole an undetermined amount of money,
and left in the family car.
7
Later that afternoon, Dawson appeared at a bar in Milford, Dela-
ware, wearing the motorcycle jacket from the previous burglary., At
the bar, Dawson introduced himself to a woman as "Abaddon" and
told her that this meant "one of Satan's disciples." 9 Dawson was even-
tually asked to leave the bar."0 As he left, a Milford police sergeant
noticed that he matched Dawson's description; however, the sergeant
was unsuccessful in apprehending him." After the police were called to
the scene of a one-car accident involving a stolen vehicle from the bar
area that contained the hat worn by Dawson the previous night, they
began a house-to-house search for Dawson.12 They discovered him the




7. Id. Mrs. Kisner's body was discovered by her son with her hands tied with shoe strings
and her mouth gagged with a sock. There was also a nylon stocking twisted around her neck.
Dawson v. Delaware, 581 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Del. 1990). The physician who performed the autopsy
stated-that the wounds around the victim's neck indicated that Dawson had attempted to strangle
her several times. The death was actually caused by one of twelve stab wounds to the woman's
chest. Id. at 1083-84 n.2.
8. 112 S. Ct. at 1095. Witnesses stated that the jacket worn by Dawson was too big for
him. Id. Dawson is five feet, ten inches tall and weighs about one hundred seventy-five pounds.
581 A.2d at 1084. The motorcycle jacket that was stolen in the burglary was a man's size forty-
eight. 581 A.2d at 1083.
9. 112 S. Ct. at 1095. "Abaddon," which is tattooed in large red letters on Dawson's stom-
ach, means "angel of the bottomless pit." 581 A.2d at 1085.
10. 112 S. Ct. at 1095.
II. 581 A.2d at 1084. Dawson was wearing a motorcycle jacket and hat when noticed by
the police sergeant. Although unsuccessful in apprehending Dawson, the sergeant was successful
in finding the murder victim's car near the Milford bar. In the car, police found items covered
with Dawson's fingerprints as well as a postcard signed "'Abaddon." Id.
12. 112 S. Ct. at 1095. Dawson's hat alerted police that he was probably in the vicinity and




Dawson was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of Kent
County, Delaware, of first-degree murder, possession of a deadly
weapon during the commission of a felony, first-degree robbery, second-
degree burglary, and possession of a deadly weapon by a felon. 4 Prior
to the separate penalty hearing before the jury to determine if Dawson
should be sentenced to death for the murder,' 5 the prosecution indi-
cated that it intended to introduce expert testimony concerning the na-
ture and origin of the Aryan Brotherhood,' 6 a white supremacist organ-
ization, and information that Dawson: (1) had an Aryan Brotherhood
tattoo on his hand; (2) called himself "Abaddon" and had the name
tattooed on his stomach; and (3) made use of swastika symbols.' 7
Before the sentencing phase began, the parties ultimately agreed to a
narrow stipulation concerning the Aryan Brotherhood evidence which
simply indicated that the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang was estab-
lished in response to other racial gangs and that separate gangs called
"the Aryan Brotherhood" exist in several state prisons."8 In exchange
for Dawson's agreement to the stipulation, the State agreed not to call
any expert witnesses to explain the nature of the organization.' 9 Even
though he had agreed to this stipulation, Dawson continued to maintain
13. 112 S. Ct. at 1095. Dawson was found wearing the stolen motorcycle jacket and carry-
ing with him stolen pocket watches, money, and a sock which matched the one used to gag Mrs.
Kisner during the murder. 581 A.2d at 1084-85.
14. 581 A.2d at 1081. Dawson pleaded guilty to misdemeanor theft and first-degree bur-
glary for his actions at the home in Kenton. He was, therefore, not indicted by the grand jury on
these two counts. Id. at 1081 n. I.
15. 112 S. Ct. at 1095. Delaware's death penalty statute requires a bifurcated trial for first-
degree murder. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4209 (1987). Once the defendant has been convicted
by a jury for first-degree murder, the Superior Court holds a separate hearing before the same
jury to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole or death. 112 S. Ct. at 1095.
16. 112 S. Ct. at 1095. From an independent search of extrinsic evidence, the Superior
Court found that the Aryan Brotherhood is "a white supremacist Nazi-oriented gang which first
originated in San Quentin Prison in California." 581 A.2d at 1085-86 n.5. The court found that
this gang typically directed its violence against minority prison gangs, such as those composed of
blacks and Latinos. The motto of the gang is: "Kill to get in and die to get out." id.
17. 112 S. Ct. at 1095-96. Dawson had painted a swastika on his cell wall while in prison
and also had swastika tattoos covering his back. Id.
18. Id. at 1096. The stipulation allowed during the sentencing phase stated only that "the
Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960s in California in
response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brother-
hood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware." Id.
19. Id. In addition to the stipulation, the prosecution was allowed to call a detective to
testify that an Aryan Brotherhood tattoo, consisting of the name "Aryan Brotherhood" with a red
and black diamond, was imprinted on Dawson's hand. 581 A.2d at I100.
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that admission of evidence regarding his membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood violated his constitutional rights under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. 0
At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecution did not introduce
the expert testimony regarding the nature of the Aryan Brotherhood
and Dawson's use of swastikas.2  The prosecution introduced to the
jury the following evidence: (1) Dawson was a member of the Aryan
Brotherhood; (2) "Aryan Brotherhood" was tattooed on Dawson's
hand; and (3) Dawson had tattooed on his stomach his nickname,
"Abaddon," which means "angel of the bottomless pit."'2 2 The prosecu-
tion also submitted proof of Dawson's prior criminal record. 23 Dawson
introduced as mitigating evidence his kindness toward family members
and good time credits received in prison.2 4 The jury recommended the
death penalty based upon its finding of three statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances.2B In addition, the jury concluded that the prosecution's ag-
20. 112 S. Ct. at 1096. Dawson argued that admission of this evidence would violate his
First Amendment rights of freedom of religion and freedom of association. 581 A.2d at 1100. The
First Amendment guarantees that "[Clongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceable to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Dawson also argued that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence would violate his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. 581 A.2d at 1100. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees the right to due process by stating: "nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
21. 112 S. Ct. at 1096. The expert testimony concerning the origin and nature of the Aryan
Brotherhood was excluded due to the stipulation agreement. Id. The swastika information was not
to be introduced during the sentencing phase without the court's permission because it did not
seem relevant to Dawson's character. The prosecution never attempted to introduce this evidence
once the court made this determination. 581 A.2d at 1101.
22. 581 A.2d at I100-01.
23. 112 S. Ct. at 1096. Dawson was first placed in a juvenile correctional facility when he
was thirteen years old, and was readmitted five times. He was convicted of fourteen felonies and
escaped from correctional facilities six times. While in prison, Dawson had sanctions brought
against him due to 24 conduct violations. 581 A.2d at 1085.
24. 112 S. Ct. at 1096, 1099. Dawson's family members testified that his aunt and sister
loved him and that Dawson once offered to donate a kidney to benefit his cousin. 581 A.2d at
1108. Dawson presented evidence of his membership in drug and alcohol rehabilitation organiza-
tions while in prison, such as Alcoholics Anonymous and the Green Tree Program. 112 S. Ct. at
1100 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He also provided evidence of his participation in counseling groups.
id.
25. 112 S. Ct. at 1096. Delaware's death penalty statute does not allow imposition of the
death sentence against a defendant unless the jury unanimously finds that at least one aggravating
circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 4209(e)(1) (1987).
Among nineteen enumerated aggravating circumstances in the statute, the jury unanimously
found that the three following circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt: "(I) that the
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gravating evidence outweighed Dawson's mitigating evidence. 6 Thus,
the trial court was required by Delaware law to impose the death
penalty.27
On automatic appeal, 8 the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed
both Dawson's conviction and his death sentence.29 The court upheld
admission of the evidence of his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
and his use of the name "Abaddon" at sentencing.30 The court rea-
soned that the jury was entitled to consider information concerning
Dawson's good and bad character traits because it had found at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance."1 The information was neces-
sary in order for the jury to make a fair determination of Dawson's
overall character and to provide him with an individualized sentence.
3 2
The court found that the character evidence concerning the name
"Abaddon" and the Aryan Brotherhood was relevant, did not violate
Dawson's constitutional rights, and did not appeal to the jury's
prejudices.3 "
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 to deter-
mine if it was constitutional error to admit the evidence concerning the
Aryan Brotherhood during the sentencing phase of Dawson's capital
murder trial.3 5 The Court held that admission of Dawson's membership
murder was committed by an escaped prisoner, (2) that the murder was committed during the
commission of a burglary, and (3) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain." 112 S. Ct.
at 1096.
26. 112 S. Ct. at 1096. The Delaware statute provides that the jury must unanimously
recommend the death penalty after carefully weighing all of the relevant aggravating and mitigat-
ing evidence for a death sentence to be imposed. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(I)(b) (1987).
27. 112 S. Ct. at 1096. Section 4209(d)(1)(b) indicates that the court is bound to impose
the death penalty if the jury has found a statutory aggravating circumstance based on the evi-
dence and if the jury has then recommended death for the defendant. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, §
4209(d)(l)(b) (1987).
28. 581 A.2d at 1081. Delaware's death penalty statute provides an automatic review of the
recommendation and imposition of the death penalty by the Supreme Court of Delaware. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g) (1987). In addition, the defendant is allowed an opportunity to
appeal his conviction, which is then reviewed in addition to the recommendation and imposition of
the death penalty. Id. § 4209(h). Dawson's appeal of his conviction and the automatic appeal were
consolidated by the Supreme Court of Delaware. 581 A.2d at 1081.
29. 112 S. Ct. at 1096.
30. Id.
31. id.
32. Id. It is important to make "an individualized determination on the basis of character of
the individual and the circumstances of the crime" since each defendant's situation is unique, and
the defendant's life is at risk. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1982).
33. 581 A.2d at 1103.
34. Dawson v. Delaware, III S. Ct. 1412 (1991).
35. 112 S. Ct. at 1096.
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in the Aryan Brotherhood as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase
was constitutional error which violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.36 The Court reasoned that the evidence was not
relevant to legitimate issues in the sentencing proceeding and that it
penalized him for beliefs and opinions that had no nexus to the crime. 7
It vacated the Supreme Court of Delaware's judgment upholding ad-
mission of the evidence and remanded the case for further proceedings,
leaving open the question of whether it was harmless error to admit the
Aryan Brotherhood evidence at the hearing. 8
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
When a court is faced with the possibility of imposing capital pun-
ishment, the court must consider many interrelated issues pertaining to
the rights of the capital defendant. These rights often involve aspects of
the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. To facilitate under-
standing of the complex issues presented in Dawson, the evolution and
development of the regulation of capital punishment under the Eighth
Amendment is first discussed. 39 Then, this note details the progression
of the capital defendant's rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 0
A. Regulation of Capital Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment
Since death is the most severe penalty available for a crime, the
Supreme Court has frequently struggled with the concept of the death
penalty as cruel and unusual punishment.41 The Eighth Amendment
was ratified over two hundred years ago to prevent the imposition of
cruel and unusual punishments. 4 Therefore, the Supreme Court's gen-
eral interpretation of the death penalty has been that it is constitutional
if imposed pursuant to guidelines that the Court deems to be consistent
36. Id. at 1095.
37. Id. at 1098-99.
38. Id. at 1099.
39. See infra notes 44-75 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
41. See generally John B. Wefing, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 20 SETON HALL L.
REV. 478, 485 (1990) (discussing diverse views of cruel and unusual punishment held by members
of the Court).
42. Id. at 478. The Eighth Amendment guarantees that: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII (emphasis added).
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with the Eighth Amendment. 3
Prior to 1972, juries were given absolute discretion to impose
death sentences without guided discretion from the courts." Commen-
tators and courts have stated that the death penalty was imposed so
arbitrarily that it was difficult to deny that any death sentence was
cruel and unusual punishment.4 5 In 1972, a majority of the Court in
Furman v. Georgia," clarified its position on the Eighth Amendment as
it applied to capital punishment by striking down the death penalty as
then applied.47 The Court found that the system, which placed absolute
discretion with the jury, was arbitrary and capricious, and thereby vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment.4 8 This decision ended the minimal re-
quirements that were previously needed for the imposition of death
sentences.49 Instead of the imposition of an arbitrary penalty based on
total jury discretion, the Court demanded that capital punishment be
imposed only when all relevant evidence had been considered by the
jury or statutory requirements concerning aggravating circumstances
had been met.50
In response to the Furman decision, a number of states passed new
death penalty laws. 1 In a series of 1976 cases,"2 the Supreme Court
43. Jacqueline Cook, Coming Full Circle: A Return to Arbitrary Sentencing Patterns in
Capital Punishment Cases, 56 UMKC L. REV. 387, 396 (1988).
44. See Thomas P. Bishop & Abby L. Martin, Statutory Aggravating Circumstances and
the Death Penalty: What Lies Beyond the Threshold after Zant v. Stephens?, 35 MERCER L. REV.
1443, 1444-45 (1984).
45. Cook, supra note 43, at 388-89.
46. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to three death
row inmates to consider if imposition of the death penalty in their cases was cruel and unusual
punishment which violated the Eighth and. Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 240. Two defendants
had been sentenced to death for rape; the other received the death penalty for a murder convic-
tion. Five separate opinions composed the judgment of the Court that the death penalty in these
cases was cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 365-71. By allowing juries to sentence convicted capital defendants with no regu-
lation of their decision, juries can be very discriminatory. Id. The Court indicated that mostly
poor minorities are sentenced to death. Id. The Court found death penalties given in this manner
to be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
See also Cook, supra note 43, at 388-89; Mark T. Hunzeker, The Fate of Aggravating Cir-
cumstances (l)(d) after State v. Hunt, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 531, 537-38 (1986).
49. See Bishop & Martin, supra note 44, at 1445 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)).
50. See Bishop & Martin, supra note 44, at 1446.
51. Most state legislatures passed new death penalty statutes that contained "guided discre-
tion" schemes. Richard E. Wirick, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After
Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 689, 690 (1984).
52. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that a death sentence for murder did
390 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:383
upheld statutory schemes that "guided the discretion" of the sentencing
jury in capital hearings. 53 The "guided discretion" approved by the
Court included separate trial and sentencing phases, specified aggravat-
ing circumstances that must be found in order to impose death, and
appellate court review of the sentence imposed.54 These statutes were
found to provide individualized sentencing determination as required by
the Eighth Amendment. 55 Some statutes that responded to the Furman
absolute discretion problem with provisions for mandatory death
sentences were struck down as violative of the Eighth Amendment.5"
The Supreme Court found these statutes to be unconstitutional because
they merely established standard sentencing rather than the required
individualized sentencing.57
Having established the basis for regulated jury discretion in capi-
tal sentencing proceedings, 8 the Court then had occasion to review the
permissible scope of mitigating and aggravating evidence during the
sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial. 59 In Lockett v. Ohio60 the
not violate the Eighth Amendment under a "guided discretionary" death penalty statute that
called for a bifurcated trial, consideration of aggravating and mitigating statutory factors, and
appellate review to determine if the sentence imposed was disproportionate to the crime); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (holding that the death penalty was not per se cruel and unusual
punishment that violates the United States Constitution when there is a "guided discretion" death
penalty statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (holding that it is not unconstitutional to
impose the death penalty on a defendant for first-degree murder when there is regulation of sen-
tencer discretion).
53. Bishop & Martin, supra note 44, at 1448.
The Supreme Court declared that the death penalty was constitutional when administered
under "guided discretion" statutes because the sentencing authority's discretion was regulated by
statutory guidelines for considering relevant information instead of total sentencing discretion. Id.
"Guided discretion" statutes are those which "allow the sentencer to impose the death pen-
alty according to legislatively defined standards." Shelley Clarke, A Reasoned Moral Response:
Rethinking Texas's Capital Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX. L. REv. 407,
424 (1990).
54. Wirick, supra note 51, at 690; Bishop & Martin, supra note 44, at 1444-45.
55. See Bishop & Martin, supra note 44, at 1447.
56. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (finding Louisiana's death penalty
scheme unconstitutional due to its mandatory imposition of a death sentence upon conviction of
one of five first-degree murder categories); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(holding that the mandatory death sentence imposed on the two defendants for first-degree mur-
der violated the Eighth Amendment because it was arbitrarily imposed and degraded humanity by
not considering each individual's situation before imposing the punishment).
57. See Bishop & Martin, supra note 44, at 1447.
58. See Wirick, supra note 51, at 689-90. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
59. See Hunzeker, supra note 48, at 538. "Guided discretion" statutes that allowed the
consideration of evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase
were held constitutional by the Supreme Court. Id. Aggravating circumstances, which add to the
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Court struck down state-imposed restrictions on'mitigating evidence."
Although mitigating evidence was previously allowed to be considered
in sentencing,62 the Lockett majority concluded that the sentencer must
not be prevented from considering any evidence concerning the defend-
ant's character or the nature of the crime that the defendant desires to
present in mitigation. The Court stated that preclusion of mitigating
evidence violated the Eighth Amendment by not allowing the defend-
ant the opportunity to submit evidence in favor of a sentence less than
death.64 The Supreme Court subsequently broadened death-sentencer
discretion by allowing consideration of mitigating factors to prevent the
imposition of the death penalty. 5
To achieve the Court's requirement of individualized sentencing
under the Eighth Amendment, admission of aggravating circumstances
in capital sentencing proceedings as provided for in the "guided discre-
tion" statutes was needed.6 Generally, aggravating circumstances are
injurious consequences of the crime committed, and mitigating circumstances, which may be con-
sidered to reduce the penalty imposed by law, are both allowed as evidence during a capital sen-
tencing proceeding. Id.
60. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In Lockett, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated murder
and was sentenced to death. The Ohio death penalty statute provided that the death sentence must
be imposed unless one of three narrow mitigating circumstances was found. In failing to allow the
sentencing judge to consider the defendant's character and crime, the death penalty statute se-
verely limited the amount of mitigating evidence that could be considered to lessen the punish-
ment. The Court held that the Ohio death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it failed to
provide for individualized sentencing as required by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 602-06.
61. Miranda B. Strassmann, Mills v. Maryland: The Supreme Court Guarantees the Con-
sideration of Mitigating Circumstances Pursuant to Lockett v. Ohio, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 907,
920 (1989); Bishop & Martin, supra note 44, at 1450.
62. See Strassman, supra note 61, at 909-10. When juries were allowed total discretion in
capital sentencing, they were able to consider mitigating evidence. The juries were inclined to
avoid imposition of a death penalty where mitigating evidence tended to show that the penalty was
inappropriate. Id. However, it was not until Lockett that the Court required that all relevant
mitigating evidence provided by the defendant be considered. Id. at 919-20.
63. 438 U.S. at 604.
64. Id.
65. See e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (finding the Texas death penalty stat-
ute unconstitutional because it did not allow the jury to fully consider mitigating evidence of the
defendant's mental retardation and abusive upbringing); Skipper v. South Carolina, 467 U.S. 1
(1986) (concluding that a defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant mitigating
evidence in order to receive a lesser sentence); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (indi-
cating that state courts are not allowed to completely refuse consideration of relevant mitigating
circumstances offered by the defendant to avoid the death penalty). See also Sarah W. Welling-
ton, People v. Deere: Mitigating Evidence in Capital Sentencing: Defense Opportunity or Obliga-
tion?, 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 349, 354-55 (1987).
66. Clarke, supra note 53, at 428. In capital penalty hearings, an aggravating circumstance
refers to a "factor that the sentencer must find before it can impose the death penalty." Id.
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narrowly defined in the death penalty statutes.8 7 The Court has stated
that clear definition of aggravating circumstances differs in importance
based on each state's statutory scheme for "guided discretion." 68 In
"weighing" states, the statutory scheme provides for capital sentencing
based on the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor with
aggravating evidence then weighed against mitigating evidence.69 In
"non-weighing" states, at least one statutory aggravating factor must
be found by the jury in order to impose the death penalty. 70 However,
the jury is not then limited to a consideration of the statutory aggravat-
ing evidence, but may consider all evidence that has been presented
relating to the defendant and his crime in order to determine an appro-
priate sentence. 71 Even though the Court's approach to admission of
non-statutory aggravating evidence differs depending on a "weighing"
or "non-weighing" statutory scheme, the Court has indicated that both
schemes are constitutional because they provide for guided discretion in
determining individualized sentences as required under the Eighth
Amendment.
72
The types of evidence allowed as aggravating circumstances dur-
ing a capital sentencing hearing have recently been expanded by the
Court. In Payne v. Tennessee7 3 the Court upheld the State's use of vic-
tim impact statements as aggravating evidence.74 The Court indicated
that, just as a defendant may exhibit his individualism through a wide
range of mitigating evidence, so may the State portray the victim's in-
67. Clarke, supra note 53, at 428.
68. See Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1136 (1992) (indicating that aggravating factors
must be defined more precisely in "weighing" states).
69. See e.g., Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
738 (1990); Williams v. State, 274 Ark. 9, 621 S.W.2d 686 (1981). Delaware is a "weighing"
state in regard to its "guided discretion" scheme. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 4209 (1987).
70. See e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 871-73 (1983) (holding that under Georgia's
"guided discretion" scheme, the jury must consider statutory aggravating circumstances to deter-
mine if a death penalty may be imposed and then must consider all aggravating evidence to
determine if the death penalty should be imposed).
7 1. Id.
72. E.g.. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. .1130, 1136-37 (1992).
73. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), overruling, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). In Payne,
the defendant murdered a mother and her daughter and attempted to murder the son. During the
sentencing proceeding, the defendant presented mitigating evidence concerning his life and char-
acter. As aggravating evidence, the State presented statements concerning the impact of the two
murders on the victims' family, especially upon the young boy who had lost his mother and sister.
In overruling Booth v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that admission of the victim impact
statements did not violate the capital defendant's constitutional rights protected under the Eighth
Amendment. Ill S. Ct. at 2608-10.
74. III S. Ct. at 2610.
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dividuality as an aggravating circumstance.75
B. Protection of Capital Defendants' Rights Under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments
Additional opportunities are afforded capital defendants to avoid
imposition of the death penalty. During sentencing hearings, a capital
defendant may raise constitutional objections based on First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights to the admission of certain evidence. For a
better understanding of constitutional objections in this context, it is
essential to outline the developments of the rights protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
76
Included in the rights protected by the First Amendment is free-
dom of association. 77 The right.to freely associate is not expressly enu-
merated in the United States Constitution.78 It is, however, implied in
the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, and assem-
bly, as well as in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.79 The right to freely associate is "almost as inalienable in its
75. Id. at 2608 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987)).
76. The First Amendment guarantees that "[Clongress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." US CONST. amend. I.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
77. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
78. See Randy E. Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We
Have? The Case of Associational Freedoms, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 107-10 (1987).
The right is an important element of the background property rights that are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from the deprivation of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law." Implied in the Due Process Clause is
the protection of associational freedoms. Id.
79. Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association, 10 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 91, 91 (1987). The Supreme Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause to incorporate the "'fundamental" constitutional rights guaranteed in the first ten
amendments and extend them to the states. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 361
(3d ed. 1986). See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (extending First Amendment
protection to the states by incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
The Court eventually made it clear that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause applied to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Loui-
siana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) (holding that a second attempt at punishment by
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nature as the right of personal liberty. ' 80 The idea of explicitly recog-
nizing freedom of association as a protected First Amendment right
developed gradually.
81
In 1958, the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized freedom of
association as a protected constitutional right in NAACP v. Alabama."
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) refused to produce membership lists requested by the Ala-
bama Attorney General in order to satisfy compliance with a state
qualification statute for all foreign corporations conducting business in
Alabama.8" The NAACP claimed that compelling disclosure of mem-
bership lists violated its members' constitutional right to freely associ-
ate. 84 The Court stated that freedom of association in order to advance
similar beliefs is a liberty which is protected by the First Amend-
death by electrocution when the first attempt failed was not denial of due process or cruel and
unusual punishment).
80. LAWRENCE H, TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1011 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting
ALEXANDER DE TOCQUEVILLE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (P. Bradley ed. 1945)).
81. During the Cold War years of the 1950s, defendants could be penalized for their mem-
bership in organizations holding Communist "dissident" beliefs even though that membership had
no correlation to the defendant's actions. Government concern due to the Communist "Red Scare"
resulted in these types of restrictions on an individual's freedom to associate and prompted the
Court's delay in expressing a clear right of free association. These infringements on associational
freedoms were part of legislative acts passed for the purpose of exposing affiliation with the Com-
munist party. The Supreme Court upheld these restrictions in order to protect our country from
"Communist infiltration." See EDMUND LINDOP. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND LANDMARK CASES, 58,
90 (1989). See also Alder v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), rev'd by Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding a "loyalty test" permissible where a teacher could be
dismissed for mere association with a subversive group); Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (allowing state inquiry into membership with the Communist party
through a requirement for state employees to sign affidavits concerning their association with the
party).
By the late 1950s and the 1960s, the Court moved away from suppression of Communism
and moved toward protection of the right of freedom of association. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (finding a loyalty oath unconstitutionally vague); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (finding it unconstitutional to restrict travel for mere
membership in the Communist party); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957)
(concluding that past membership in the Communist party was not a valid reason for refusing a
person the right to take the exam for admission to the Bar). Accord Cooper v. Henslee, 257 Ark.
963, 522 S.W.2d 391 (1975) (holding a statute that proscribed employment with the state because
of membership in the Communist party violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutional).
However, it was not until 1958 in NAACP v. Alabama that the Supreme Court clearly ex-
pressed the right to freely associate. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 79, at 947 (citing NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
82. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
83. Id. at 451.
84. Id. at 458-60.
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ment. 5 The Supreme Court then engaged in a "balancing test" which
weighed the State's need for the membership evidence against the
prejudice that might result to the NAACP members from compelled
disclosure.8 6 It determined that the right of the individual to freely as-
sociate as guaranteed in the First Amendment outweighed the govern-
ment's interest in obtaining the membership information." The Court
held that without a compelling interest, the government cannot force
disclosure of membership lists and intrude on the rights of organization
members simply because of their association with that organization and
its beliefs.
88
The Supreme Court has also extended First Amendment protec-
tion of the freedom of association to those organizations that hold dissi-
dent beliefs.8 9 In Elfbrant v. Russell" the Court addressed the issue of
whether a member who knows of subversive beliefs held by her organi-
zation could be penalized for mere association without the intent to
further the subversive beliefs. 91 The Supreme Court held that it is not
unlawful to be a member of an association knowing that the group
holds dissident beliefs as long as the member does not intend to further
85. Id. at 460. See Marsha R. Schermer, Freedom of Association: NAACP v. Alabama? 41
OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 832 (1980).
86. 357 U.S. at 463. See Gregory L. Padgett, Racially-motivated Violence and Intimida-
tion: Inadequate State Enforcement and Federal Civil Rights Remedies, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 103, 112-13 (1984). The new balancing test created in NAACP "weighs the likelihood
and gravity of a chilling effect on the exercise of association against the state's legitimate interest
in obtaining the information." Id.
If the balance is not properly struck, the information could have a prejudicial effect on the
member whose rights of free association have been violated. There is prejudice when the relevant
evidence persuades the jury or court to make an improper decision, or the jury or court causes the
evidence to be given more weight than it should have been given. Susan M. Davies, Evidence of
Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 524 (1991).
The Court in NAACP also determined that infringement on the right to associate freely is "sub-
ject to the closest scrutiny." 357 U.S. at 461.
87. 357 U.S. at 466.
88. Id. at 459-60, 466. See also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (holding
that a state could not compel disclosure of membership lists and infringe on associational free-
doms without showing a compelling interest in the information).
89. See Elfbrant v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
90. 384 U.S. II (1966). In Elfbrant, an Arizona school teacher challenged the constitution-
ality of a statute that required her to take a loyalty oath that allowed for dismissal from office if
she became a member of an organization that she knew had the unlawful purpose of overthrowing
the government. She could not decide if she should take the oath. The Supreme Court found that
the statute was invalid because it infringed upon freedom of association for members who did not
have the intent to act on the unlawful objectives of the organization. Id. at 17-19.
91. Id. at 12-13.
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those beliefs.92 Also, the Court concluded that a law which infringes on
freedom of association for mere membership without an intent to fur-
ther subversive beliefs is invalid.13 Holding or teaching subversive, ab-
stract beliefs is not considered the same as committing an unlawful
action based on those beliefs. 94 The Court supports the view that beliefs
and associations which hold beliefs that are contrary to the norm of
society are still given First Amendment protection. 95 Because the First
Amendment protects the right to associate with dissident groups, courts
have held that using this membership evidence against a criminal de-
fendant in the absence of a compelling state interest violates his free-
dom of association.96
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT IN DAWSON
Applying the precedent and principles previously discussed, the
Supreme Court concluded in Dawson v. Delaware that a criminal de-
fendant's constitutional rights of freedom of association and due pro-
cess can be violated when such constitutionally protected information is
wrongfully used as evidence of aggravating circumstances in a capital
sentencing proceeding. 97 The Court cited its conclusion in NAACP v.
Alabama that the freedom to associate with those holding similar be-
liefs is protected by the First Amendment. 8 However, the Court re-
fused to accept Dawson's broad contention that consideration of any of
these protected beliefs or activities in the penalty phase of a criminal
trial violates the United States Constitution. 9 Using Payne v. Tennes-
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id. See also Schware v. Board of Bar. Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (prohibiting
states from penalizing an individual for membership in the Communist Party when there is no
correlation between the person's membership and their actions or character).
94. See Padgett, supra note 86, at 107-08.
95. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (stating that the government
cannot infringe upon religious beliefs which are given First Amendment protection even though
the beliefs do not conform to the norms of society).
96. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Cooper v. Henslee, 257 Ark.
963, 522 S.W.2d 391 (1975). But see Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (upholding consid-
eration of dissident beliefs and racial hatred stemming from Barclay's membership in the Black
Liberation Army because the evidence was relevant to his murder of a white victim).
97. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1095. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion of
the Court. Id.
98. Id. at 1096-97. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (concluding that free-
dom of association in the NAACP is protected, and the organization cannot be compelled to
disclose its membership lists). See also supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
99. 112 S. Ct. at 1097. Dawson's basis for his broad contention concerning constitutional
protection can be found in Zant v. Stephens where the Supreme Court discussed the invalidity of
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see'00 to emphasize that a sentencing authority is free to consider a
broad range of relevant material, 01 the Court then cited Barclay v.
Florida"0 2 to illustrate the propriety of admitting dissident beliefs and
acts as aggravating evidence in capital sentencing hearings if the evi-
dence is relevant.' 03 Pointing to the Barclay decision, which allowed
admission of evidence of racial hatred related to the defendant's crime
to be used as aggravating evidence in capital sentencing, the Court dis-
tinguished the situation in Dawson because of the lack of connection
between Dawson's dissident beliefs and his crime. 04 Nonetheless, the
Court declared that the First Amendment does not construct a per se
barrier against the admission of evidence concerning constitutionally
protected beliefs and associations. 10 5
Although the Court rejected Dawson's contention that the First
Amendment is a per se bar to admitting evidence of protected beliefs at
sentencing, 06 it, nonetheless, found that admission of evidence concern-
ing Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was constitutional
error. 10 7 Because the stipulation regarding Dawson's membership in the
Aryan Brotherhood was so narrow, the Court determined that the evi-
dence became totally irrelevant in the sentencing hearing. 108 However,
the Court indicated in dictum that had the prosecution presented its
expert testimony on the nature of the Aryan Brotherhood during the
sentencing, Dawson's case would have a very different outcome. 0 9 The
aggravating circumstances that cause the jury to form a negative view of the defendant from his
engagement in constitutionally protected activities. 462 U'S. 862, 885 (1982).
100. II1 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
101. 112 S. Ct. at 1097. See Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2606 (1991); United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972).
102. 463 U.S. 939 (1983). See supra note 96.
103. 112 S. Ct. at 1097 (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983)).
104. Id. at 1098.
105. Id. at 1097.
106. Id.
107. Id. Contra Dawson, 581 A.2d at 1103-04.
108. 112 S. Ct. at 1097. The stipulation indicated only that the Aryan Brotherhood is a
prison gang which holds certain abstract beliefs. Using Dawson's mere membership in the associa-
tion as an aggravating circumstance with no evidence of illegal actions arising from that member-
ship, the evidence was rendered irrelevant to the capital sentencing proceeding. The simple stipu-
lation stated "the Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960s
in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the
Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware." ld. at 1096.
109. Id. at 1097. The prosecution had planned to present expert evidence to the jury "that
the Aryan Brotherhood is a white racist prison gang that is associated with drugs and violent
escape attempts at prison, and that advocates the murder of fellow inmates." Id. Once the stipula-
tion was agreed to, this testimony was not admitted. Id.
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Court implied that evidence firmly establishing the Aryan Brother-
hood's advocacy of drug use, violent prison escape attempts, and mur-
der plots on prison inmates could have been admissible as aggravating
evidence because of a legitimate state interest. 1 0 Nevertheless, the in-
ference that the jury was allowed to make from the narrow member-
ship information that was presented proved only the abstract beliefs of
the Delaware Aryan Brotherhood gang and did not prove the gang's
involvement or endorsement of any violent acts.'11
Further, the Court found the evidence insufficient to establish an
aggravating circumstance because it merely presented the Aryan
Brotherhood's abstract beliefs.1 1 2 The evidence did not prove that the
Aryan Brotherhood had committed or endorsed any violent acts.1 3 The
admission of this evidence during Dawson's sentencing hearing violated
his First Amendment rights by proving only his abstract beliefs and not
indicating that he acted on these beliefs." 4 Again, in dictum, the Court
indicated that the prosecution could have avoided constitutional
problems by offering evidence of Dawson's actions in addition to his
abstract beliefs.' 15 The evidence of his beliefs was not relevant charac-
ter evidence to admit during sentencing, and the Court suggested that
the prosecution may have presented it in order for the jury to develop a
prejudice against Dawson based solely upon his beliefs. 1 '
Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was not
relevant to rebut Dawson's mitigating evidence. 7 Dawson's member-
ship in prison rehabilitation programs, such as Alcoholics Anonymous
and the Green Tree program, was admitted as mitigating evidence to
show his "good" character."5 Although the prosecution has a right to
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1098.
112. Id.
113. Id. Evidence of membership in an association can be relevant as an aggravating cir-
cumstance if the association endorses violent acts, because that evidence may show that the de-
fendant could be a future danger to society. Id.
114. Id. A person's right to associate cannot be violated simply because of his or her beliefs
without actions intended to further those beliefs. See Elfbrant v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
115. 112 S. Ct. at 1098.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1096, 1099. Dawson received good time credits in prison for his participation in
these rehabilitation programs. Id. His mitigating evidence was presented as "'good" character evi-
dence in and of itself. Id. at 1099. Dawson also presented his kindness toward family members as
mitigating evidence. Id. at 1096, 1099.
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rebut evidence presented by the defendant in mitigation, 1 9 the Court
determined that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was not. appropriate
for rebuttal because it was not relevant "bad" character evidence in
and of itself. 20 The Supreme Court cited with approval the "balancing
test" developed in NAACP v. Alabama.2' as it was applied in Bates v.
City of Little Rock'22 where the Court- found that the First Amend-
ment prohibits the prosecution from infringing on associational rights if
there is no link between the information desired and a compelling state
interest. 2 ' Applying that test in Dawson, the Court concluded that
there was not a sufficient link between Dawson's membership in the
Aryan Brotherhood and his crime for the information to be relevant
during sentencing. 2 " The majority of the Court then held that the First
Amendment prohibits the use of evidence of the defendant's abstract
beliefs as an aggravating circumstance during the penalty phase when
those beliefs are not relevant to the issue being tried. 2 ' Suggesting the
possibility that the admission of the evidence could be harmless error,
the majority remanded the case for further consideration by the Su-
preme Court of Delaware. 26
119. Id. at 1098-99. A defendant in a capital penalty hearing may present an) relevant
evidence in mitigation in order to attempt to receive a lesser penalty than death. Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-17 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-06 (1978). The
State is given a broad range of freedom in rebutting evidence given in mitigation. See Payne v.
Tennessee, I I I S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) (stressing that the State is interested in rebutting the
mitigating evidence offered by the defendant).
120. 112 S. Ct. at 1098-99.
121. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
122. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
123. 112 S. Ct. at 1099 (citing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)).
124. Id.
125. Id. The Court's basis for this holding may be found in the following: NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (stating that the government cannot intrude on members' rights sim-
ply because they associate with a certain organization and its beliefs); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (holding that past membership in the Communist Party was not
a valid reason for refusing a person the right to take an exam for admission to the Bar).
126. 112 S. Ct. at 1099. The constitutional error in Dawson was an evidential error which
can be considered harmless error when taken into consideration with other existing evidence.
Therefore, the Court, following existing precedent, remanded the case for consideration of harm-
less error with a minimum amount of instructions concerning the issue. Id. See generally Thomas
G. Myrum, State v. Paz: Adoption of the Harmless-Error Standard of Review for Capital-Sen-
tencing Errors, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 375, 380 (1991) (discussing how the Court has recognized that
error during capital trials and sentencing may be regarded as harmless error). See also Arizona v.
Fulminante, I II S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (referring to evidential errors for which a harmless
error analysis may be applied).
On remand, the Supreme Court of Delaware vacated Dawson's death sentence and remanded
the case to the Superior Court for a new capital sentencing proceeding. Dawson v. Delaware, 608
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the
majority did not require the Supreme Court of Delaware to find the
wrongful admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence as harmless er-
ror on remand.127 Justice Blackmun stated that there are certain types
of constitutional errors for which the Supreme Court has refused to
apply a harmless error analysis.' 28 He also stated that it could prove
detrimental to apply the harmless error analysis to Dawson's case be-
cause of the potential chilling effect it might have on First Amendment
activities. 12 9 Since the harmless error issue was not raised, Justice
Blackmun suggested that it would be better for the Supreme Court of
Delaware to consider the issue on remand. 130
As the sole dissenter, Justice Thomas agreed with the Supreme
Court of Delaware that the evidence of Dawson's association with the
Aryan Brotherhood was relevant in the penalty hearing.' Rejecting
the majority's contention that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was ir-
relevant because it proved only Dawson's abstract racist beliefs, Justice
Thomas stated that a jury could reasonably infer that Dawson had
committed an illegal act due to his membership in a racist prison
gang. 3 2 He indicated that jurors understand the nature of a prison
gang when introduced by the prosecution as aggravating evidence
much like they comprehend the nature of the Boy Scouts or a church
choir when introduced by the defense counsel as mitigating evidence. 31
Justice Thomas argued that explanations were not needed for Dawson's
A.2d 1201, 1206 (Del. 1992). The State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the
admission of the associational evidence during sentencing did not contribute to Dawson's death
sentence. Id. at 1205. Therefore, the court concluded that the constitutional error was not harm-
less. Id. at 1206.
127. 112 S. Ct. at 1099. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1099-100 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,
49-50 & n.9 (1984) (determining that harmless error analysis should not be applied to a constitu-
tional error depriving a defendant the right to a public trial); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535
(1927) (finding harmless error analysis inappropriate where the constitutional error involved a
defendant's right to a trial before an impartial judge).
129. 112 S. Ct. at 1100 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See Arizona v. Fulminante, I II S. Ct.
1246, 1257 (1991) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587 (1986)) ("[C]ertain constitutional
errors are not, and should not be, subject to harmless-error analysis because those rights protect
important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial.").
130. 112 S. Ct. at I 100 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas claimed that Dawson's association was
evidence of his character which was relevant in determining if he should be put to death. Id.
Justice Thomas also believed that evidence of Dawson's gang membership was relevant to his
character, and in turn, Dawson's character was relevant in the sentencing phase. Id.




membership in the "bad" Aryan Brotherhood organization since they
were unnecessary for his participation in the "good" Alcoholics Anony-
mous and Green Tree organizations.' 3 ' In addition, the evidence ap-
peared relevant to Justice Thomas because it rebutted Dawson's miti-
gating evidence of kindness to his family by showing that his
membership in a racist prison gang would not allow him to be kind to
members of other races. 35 Most importantly, Justice Thomas consid-
ered the evidence relevant because it showed that Dawson could pre-
sent a future danger to society. 13
Further, he asserted that the gang membership evidence indicated
that Dawson possessed the character of a person likely to engage in
violent gang activities. 137 Justice Thomas argued that the Aryan'Broth-
erhood evidence was relevant simply because it indicated that the or-
ganization was a racist prison gang and that Dawson was a member. 3 8
He indicated that the evidence was sufficiently relevant to establish
Dawson's character 3 9 because it strongly suggested that he engaged in
criminal activity as a result of the association.140 Contrary to the ma-
jority's interpretation, the holding in Barclay v. Florida"1 that racist
beliefs which fueled the commission of a crime were relevant during
capital sentencing suggested to Justice Thomas that evidence of Daw-
son's membership in a racist gang was similarly relevant." 2 He as-
serted that a jury could infer from Dawson's membership in the racist
gang that he had acted upon his racial prejudice, and the membership
evidence was, therefore, relevant." 3
As a result, Justice Thomas argued that the majority opinion es-
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1101-02 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1102 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Membership in the Aryan Brotherhood prison
gang suggested to Justice Thomas that Dawson was troublesome in prison, which indicated that
he would be dangerous in the future. Id.
137. Id. at 1101 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The general activities of gang members are devi-
ant or unlawful in nature. Id. (citing UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE. PRISON GANGS: THEIR
EXTENT. NATURE AND IMPACT ON PRISONS x-xi (1985)). The Aryan Brotherhood has been la-
belled a "singularly vicious prison gang." United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir.
1988).
138. 112 S. Ct. at I 101 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 463 U.S. 939 (1983). See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
142. 112 S. Ct. at 1102 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939
(1983)).
143. Id. The theory underlying Justice Thomas' reasoning is unsound in that it infers racial
motives for the murder when both Dawson and Mrs. Kisner were white.
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tablished a double standard for relevance which is simple for the de-
fendant to establish, but difficult for the State.144 The capital defendant
is allowed to introduce all relevant evidence in mitigation." 5 By al-
lowing the jury to draw inferences from "good" character evidence
while considering "bad" character evidence that required similar infer-
ences to be irrelevant, the Court advocated, in his opinion, presenting a
distorted view of the evidence to the jury during sentencing.
14 6
Next, Justice Thomas stated that there was no First Amendment
right violated because the State had proven more than the defendant's
abstract beliefs through the Aryan Brotherhood evidence. 47 He as-
serted that the Court failed to decide if abstract beliefs constituted a
part of a defendant's character which is allowed for consideration dur-
ing sentencing . 4 8 Therefore, he contended that the Court's decision
merely limited the aspects of character that can be considered by the
sentencer without defining the permissible boundaries of character in-
quiry. 4 9 Justice Thomas indicated that the Court's boundaries were
unclear because it failed to explain why some First Amendment activi-
ties can be considered character evidence while others cannot. 50 Fi-
nally, Justice Thomas argued that, even if the Aryan Brotherhood evi-
dence was irrelevant, the First Amendment was not at issue.1 51 Instead,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
method for correcting the improper admission of evidence that prevents
a fair trial. 52 He, therefore, concluded that Dawson's death sentence
144. Id.
145. Id. Capital defendants frequently use abstract beliefs from associations as good char-
acter evidence. Id. Dawson introduced his membership in prison rehabilitation organizations as
good character evidence. Id.
146. Id. at 1103 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has recently condemned a
similar distorted view of the evidence. id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, I I I S. Ct. 2597 (1991)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1103-04 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has held for an extended
period that the United States Constitution allows consideration of character evidence in penalty
hearings. Id. at 1104. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949) (allowing sen-
tencing judge broad scope in considering the defendant's character during sentencing
proceedings).
150. 112 S. Ct. at 1104 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that admission
of unduly prejudicial evidence that results in an unfair trial is forbidden by the Due Process




V. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court's opinion in Dawson v. Delaware further de-
fined relevance of evidence, which is partially based on how much a
jury is allowed to infer from the evidence presented.1 54 In order to pro-
tect the First Amendment freedoms of belief and association, the Court
limits evidence that may be used as aggravating evidence during capi-
tal sentencing. Evidence of the capital defendant's abstract beliefs,. un-
supported by actions in furtherance of those beliefs, is not admissible
because the abstract beliefs are not relevant to the sentencing issues.' 55
Therefore, Dawson makes it clear that when First Amendment free-
doms are likely to be infringed upon, the evidence sought to be used in
aggravation must be relevant to the sentencing issues. It cannot be
presented simply because the defendant's beliefs or associations are
unpopular.
As a result, Dawson favors admission of the capital defendant's
mitigating evidence in order for the defendant to receive a more lenient
sentencing.' By allowing the jury to infer Dawson's "good" character
through evidence of his mere membership in associations while disal-
lowing an inference of "bad" character from associational evidence, the
Court afforded greater protection for the capital defendant.157 Having
struggled with capital punishment over the years, 58 it was appropriate
153. 112 S. Ct. at 1105 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 1098-99. If aggravating evidence is established as relevant to the issue at
hand, it is allowed in sentencing proceedings. See Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597 (1991)
(indicating the consideration of victim impact statements as aggravating circumstances in sentenc-
ing is constitutional); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1982) (stating the invalidation of one
statutory aggravating circumstance in a "non-weighing state" did not give reason to vacate a
death sentence when two statutory aggravating circumstances that were relevant were present).
155. 112 S. Ct. at 1098.
156. The decision in Dawson reinforces the idea established in Lockett v. Ohio that a broad
consideration of relevant mitigating evidence is allowed. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The imbalance
created by allowing jury discretion with mitigating evidence while not allowing discretion with
aggravating evidence is justified because it is more acceptable to avoid the imposition of a death
sentence than to allow errors in imposing one. See generally Strassmann, supra note 61.
157. See 112 S. Ct. at 1102-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas indicated that this
double standard for determining relevancy of evidence in capital sentencing does not allow the
jury to make a fair and balanced determination of the defendant's character. Instead, the jury is
presented with a distorted picture of the defendant and his "good" character traits. Id.
158. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting), expressed his dislike of the death penalty but could not understand why the
majority had suddenly found arbitrary capital sentencing unconstitutional under the Eighth
19931
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for the Court to allow the capital defendant additional opportunities to
avoid the death penalty by deeming evidence that could be highly prej-
udicial as wrongfully admitted during sentencing. The decision in Daw-
son to prevent irrelevant associational evidence from being introduced
to the jury when determining a death penalty sentence creates a guide-
line that limits jury discretion and guides the sentencer. This decision
follows the Court's previous requirement of "guided discretion" in or-
der to prevent a death sentence from being imposed arbitrarily.1 59
Another interesting approach taken by the Supreme Court in
Dawson concerns protected First Amendment rights. In Dawson, the
Court further defined First Amendment freedoms in the context of a
capital proceeding.16 The Court, which is normally hostile to chal-
lenges to capital sentences,' 6 ' emphasized the importance of First
Amendment freedoms by setting aside a death sentence based on
wrongful admission of associational evidence during sentencing.6 2 The
protection afforded Dawson firmly establishes that the Court will not
allow punishment of an individual based on mere dissident beliefs, as-
sociations, or expression of ideas. Recently, the Court confirmed this
strong stand on First Amendment rights in R.A.V. v. St. Paul.6 3 Find-
ing St. Paul's ordinance regulating speech facially unconstitutional, the
Court refused to allow the defendant to be punished for expressing his
unpopular beliefs.1 ' Although the Court found R.A.V.'s actions repre-
hensible, it upheld his First Amendment right of expressive speech on a
disfavored subject. 6 5
Employing the NAACP v. Alabama'6 balancing test, the Court in
Amendment when prior decisions had not so held. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Capi-
tal Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAvIs L.
REV. 927, 929-31 (1985) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
159. See Bishop & Martin, supra note 44, at 1445-48.
160. See 112 S. Ct. at 1097-99.
161. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597 (1991); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
939 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
162. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1099.
163. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). In RAY. the defendant allegedly burned a cross in a black
family's yard and was charged with violating the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.
Under the ordinance, the display of a symbol that is likely to incite anger or resentment in another
based on "race, color, creed, religion or gender" is prohibited. The Supreme Court held the ordi-
nance unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it prevented expression of beliefs on
disfavored subjects. Id. at 2547.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2550.
166. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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Dawson also demonstrated how protection of First Amendment associa-
tions outweighs the State's interest in the associational evidence when
it is unrelated to the crime at hand."6 7 The use of the balancing test
created a guideline for future capital cases when determining if pro-
tected beliefs or associations of the defendant can be used against him
as aggravating evidence in support of a death penalty. With the use of
a balancing test, the Court again indicated its willingness to protect a
capital defendant from punishment based strictly upon his dissident be-
liefs or associations.
1 6 8
The majority in Dawson drew a line for consideration of member-
ship evidence as possible aggravating evidence in capital sentencing.
Although the boundary is somewhat vague, 69 the Court indicated that
evidence would be deemed irrelevant in a capital sentencing proceeding
if it exposed merely dissident beliefs held by the defendant.1 70 How-
ever, the relevancy of evidence could be established if the subversive
beliefs were coupled with the defendant's subversive actions. The deci-
sion is vague, however, because the Court indicated in dictum that
Dawson's membership evidence may have been admissible if the State
had been more explicit about the Aryan Brotherhood's beliefs.171 Even
though this evidence did not explicitly indicate that Dawson had acted
on his abstract beliefs, the Court implied that it could be admissible to
demonstrate that the gang in general acted on the subversive beliefs.
1 72
The Court failed to clarify if the associational evidence could be used
against the defendant for actions committed solely by his organization
without his participation in those actions. Nonetheless, the Court's sup-
port of freedom of association in this decision reinforced the notion that
the subscription to subversive beliefs without action on those beliefs is a
protected First Amendment right.17a
167. 112 S. Ct. at 1096-99.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 1098. Associational evidence might be of a sufficient state interest to over-
ride the First Amendment protection of association given to the individual. The Supreme Court
indicated simply that "a defendant's associations might be relevant in proving other aggravating
circumstances" without giving a clear boundary of when those associations might be relevant. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1097. Had the prosecution admitted the expert testimony which verified that the
gang advocated the murder of prison inmates and was associated with drugs and escape attempts,
the outcome of Dawson might have been different. Id.
172. Id. at 1097-98.
173. See, e.g.. Elfbrant v. Russell, 384 U.S. II (1966) (indicating that membership in an




The majority's willingness to allow a harmless error analysis on
remand indicates the Court's general hostility toward vacating capital
sentences. By implying that First Amendment violations during capital
sentencing could be subject to harmless error analysis, the Court cited
the decision of Clemons v. Mississippi74 which allowed some constitu-
tional errors to be analyzed as harmless. However, the Court indicated
that state courts may develop higher standards for First Amendment
violations if they so desire. 17 5 Nonetheless, the defendant is not granted
absolute protection of his First Amendment rights. The Supreme
Court's implication that this type of constitutional error may be subject
to harmless error analysis does not afford strong protection of associa-
tions based on dissident beliefs.'1 6 Moreover, the fact that membership
in an organization advancing dissident beliefs is protected by the First
Amendment, but that the membership may be used as a factor in de-
termining the imposition of a death sentence, runs counter to the goals
of the United States Constitution to protect individuals from punish-
ment for mere dissident beliefs.
Dawson v. Delaware is also significant in that it limits what is to
be considered relevant evidence as aggravating circumstances in capital
sentencing proceedings. Defendants may be able to invoke First
Amendment rights if their defense counsel can persuade the court that
aggravating evidence represents only the defendant's beliefs and not his
action on the beliefs. Also, courts may be aided by having the possible
option of applying harmless error analysis in death penalty cases when
there is error that violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Dawson provides basic protection of First Amendment rights for the
capital defendant. However, the Court ultimately leaves open the possi-
bility to infringe upon the defendant's rights if the information is rele-
vant during capital sentencing or if violation of the rights is harmless
error. 77 Although Dawson advances protection of First Amendment
freedoms, it also indicates that these freedoms do not create a per se
barrier to the admission of associational evidence as an aggravating cir-
cumstance in death penalty sentencing.
April D. Henley
174. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
175. See 112 S. Ct. at 1099-100.
176. The majority created the possibility for the Supreme Court of Delaware to again im-
pose Dawson's death penalty if that court can establish that admission of the Aryan Brotherhood
membership evidence was harmless error. Id. at 1099.
177. Id. at 1098-99.
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